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The role of reflexivity and ethics in 
the context of autism 
 
By Damian E M Milton 
 
dƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ
in the pursuit of generaůŝƐĂďůĞƐŽĐŝĂů  ‘ĨĂĐƚƐ ? (Durkheim, 1895), yet in more recent decades, 
the dominance of the Positivist model of research has diminished (Scott and Usher, 1996, 
1999), leading to concerns regarding the  ‘situatedness ? of social researchers as producers of 
knowledge and as implicated in a relationship of power with their participants.  This essay 
outlines the ethical issues of positionality and reflexivity in research, highlighting how 
positionality is of the utmost importance with regards to my own research context: the 
ideology and practices involved in the education of people diagnosed as having an Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (ASD). 
 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ KƉŝĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ‘ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ƉŽƐŝtion adopted by a 
researcher, their assumptions regarding the topic under review and the nature of their 
research endeavour.  Therefore ? ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ƵƉŽŶ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ Ă
researcher to set out their metaphysical (ontological  W nature of reality) and epistemological 
(nature of knowledge construction) views, as well as their specific views regarding the 
nature of human agency and how humans relate to their environment.  Debates have thus 
raged for centuries over the ontological and epistemological assumptions of various 
paradigms that have tried to explain human nature.  The Positivist paradigm sees reality as 
external to the individual consciousness and consequently ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ? ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ  ‘ƌĞĂů ?
and measurable.  Interpretive or Hermeneutic theories by contrast stress the socially 
constructed and subjectively experienced nature of reality (often as expressed through 
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ Žƌ  ‘ƚĞǆƚ ? ? ?  dŚĞƐĞ ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ĂůƐŽ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
assumptions regarding tŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ  ‘ǀĂůŝĚ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?data collection and interpretation.  
For PŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŝƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĐĂŶďĞĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇ ‘ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚƋƵĂŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?&Žƌ
Interpretive theory, knowledge is experiential, personal and subjective (a constant 
intersubjective process or negotiation). 
 
For Griffiths (1998) and Greenbank (2003 ? ?ƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀŝƚǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐŵĂŬŝŶŐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
social and political value positions in relation to how they may impact on the design and 
findings of their data and conclusions.  Both theorists also argue that the self however, is not 
truly transparent to itself, and therefore enough description is needed by the researcher to 
provide their audience with information that can be used to take the researcher ?s 
positionality into account, ǁŚĞŶ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŽ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?  Ɛ
Greenbank (2003) points out: 
 
 “hƐĞƌƐŽĨďŽƚŚƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞŵĞƚŚŽĚƐĂůůŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨ
ǀĂůƵĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?dŚĞ ŝŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
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acknowledgement that educational research cannot be value-free should be included in all 
ĨŽƌŵƐŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ? ?'ƌĞĞŶďĂŶŬ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?
 
tŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĞůĚ ŽĨ ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ  ‘ƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀŝƚǇ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĐŽŵĞ Ă ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ĚĞǀŝĐĞ ĨŽƌ
analysing the impact of personal and inter-subjective processes upon a research project.  
Finlay (2008) arŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚ ? ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ
research process provides a way of attaining greater transparency and quality in the product 
of the research process.  Advice from the British Educational Research Association (2009) 
asks researchers to question themselves regarding the relevance and importance of how a 
researcher can impact upon a project, due for instance to their age, gender, religion, politics 
and experiences. 
 
As Positivists, Troyna and Carrington (1989) assume that value-free knowledge is achievable, 
that is universally applicable.  Positivists look to the methodology of the  ‘hard ? sciences for 
inspiration and thus view any influence on research design and findings due to the values 
and positionality of a researcher, as a bias in need of correction. 
 
Kuhn (1970) famously questioned the dominance of positivism as creating a false picture of 
reality.  For Kuhn (1970) research is theory-led and located within dominant paradigms 
which are historically and culturally specific.  An alternative to positivist social theory was 
posited by Intepretivism.  Tracing its ƌŽŽƚƐďĂĐŬƚŽDĂǆtĞďĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?
ĂŶĚŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ǀĞƌƐƚĞŚĞŶ ?  ?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ŝŶtentional meanings behind social action 
and human agency) argues ƚŚĂƚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĨĂŝůƐƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ůŝĨĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ŽĨ
individuals.  These ideas were explored in a variety of different directions: Symbolic 
Interactionism (Mead, 1934), Phenomenology (Husserl, 1960) and Ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, 1967).  Generally speaking, Interpretivists wish to preserve a notion of objectivity 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ Ă ůŽŽƐĞ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?  'ĂĚĂŵĂƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƚĂŬĞƐ ŚŽǁ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ? ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞĚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ůŽĐƵƐ ŽĨ his 
research.  For Gadamar (1975) the aim of interpretive research is to make sense of reality 
through the discourse and frames of reference used by participants.  Interpretivist theory 
states that phenomena are not independent of the context of the meaningful actions of 
social agents, Interpretivist ontology is therefore in stark contrast to that of Positivists.  For 
Bohman (1991) no interpretation is ever completely definitive and contains the capacity to 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ǁŚŝůƐƚ WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ  ‘ĐůŽƐƵƌĞ ? ?  &Žƌ 'ĂĚĂŵĂƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ
ĞŵĞƌŐĞƐ ƵŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůǇ ĨƌŽŵ Ă  ‘ĨƵƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƐ ? ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ Ă
controlled outcome. 
 
Critical theorists adopt the opposite view from positivists and argue that it is essential to 
ŵĂŬĞŽŶĞ ?ƐƉŽůitical and moral values transparent, as they reason that the notion of value-
free knowledge about the social world is an illusion.  A positivist notion of objectivity 
requires the researcher to stand outside of their own positionality.  The impossibility of such 
Ă ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ŵŽƐƚ ƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐůǇ ĂƐ Ă  ‘'ŽĚ ?Ɛ ĞǇĞ ǀŝĞǁ ?  ?,ĂƌĂǁĂǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Žƌ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌ EĂŐĞů  ? ? ? ? ? ? ǁŽƵůĚ ƐĂǇ  ‘ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁ ĨƌŽŵ ŶŽǁŚĞƌĞ ? ?  According to the critical 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚDĂŶŶŚĞŝŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŝƐŶ ǀĞƌ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ? ? Scott and Usher 
(1996) suggest that social research is always of a political nature, whether it is made explicit 
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ŽƌŶŽƚ ?ĂƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƐĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶĞĚďǇǁŚĂƚŝƐƚĞƌŵĞĚĂƐ ‘ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚŝƐƚŚƵƐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚŝŶ
power relationships. 
 
Postmodernist views present research as a socially and historically located practice and 
distrust absolutes and foundational truths in favour of relativism.  Thus, according to this 
view, following Positivist method will not guarantee  ‘ƚƌƵĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?  ?>ǇŽƚĂƌĚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? Post-
Positivist/modernist research can be characterised by an anti-essentialist position on 
knowledge.  Lyotard (1984) sees positivist knowledge as being a culturally located discourse 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ĞƐĐĂƉĞ ŝƚƐŽǁŶ  ‘ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶƐ ? ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ŝŶ WŽƐƚ-Positivist/modernist 
research, issues of reflexivity and discourses of power also feature strongly.  However, 
postmodernist praxis can be criticised for its lack of emancipatory effect and for a total 
refusal to accept that some discourses may be more accurate at describing the noumenal 
world, leading to the dubious conclusion that one truth may be as good as any other.  This 
may be true of the phenomenal world, yet not the noumenal. 
 
 “ŝĂƐĐŽŵĞƐŶŽƚĨƌŽŵŚĂǀŝŶŐĞƚŚŝĐĂůĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ W this is inevitable  W but from not 
acknowledging them.  Not only does such acknowledgement help to unmask any bias that is 
implicit in those views, but helps to provide a way of responding critically and sensitively to 
ƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?'ƌŝĨĨŝƚŚƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? 
 
According to Scott and Usher (1999) Positivism is losing its dominance in the social sciences, 
ǇĞƚ ŶŽƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ? ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ Žƌ ŝŶ Ă ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ƌĞĨůecting technical, rational 
principles and policy making.  Wider public appreciation of non-Positivist methodology still 
ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽďĞŚĂŵƉĞƌĞĚďǇǁŚĂƚtĞďĞƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘/ƌŽŶĂŐĞŽĨƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?tĞďĞƌ ?
1958). 
 
The critical theorist Habermas (1984) suggested that both the Positivist and Interpretive 
paradigms neglected the political and ideological situatedness of educational research.  
Habermas (1984) criticises IŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ĨŽƌƉƌŽĚƵĐŝŶŐĂ  ‘ĚŽƵďůĞŚĞƌŵĞŶĞƵƚŝĐ ?
ĂƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂŶ ‘ĂůƌĞĂĚǇŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚǁŽƌůĚ ? as a commentary rather 
than a criticism.  The critical theory of Habermas (1984) by contrast, sets out to: 
 
 “ ?ĞŵĂŶĐŝƉĂƚĞƚŚĞĚŝƐĞŵƉŽǁĞƌĞĚ ?ƚŽƌĞĚƌĞƐƐ ŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƐ ?
(Habermas, 1984:28). 
 
The Neo-Marxist writer Eagleton (1991) suggests that contemporary identities are 
ĞŶƚƌĞŶĐŚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ  ‘ĨĂůƐĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĞĚ ? ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ĂďŽƵƚ ďǇ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ
powerlessness, so research should aim to question the legitimacy of power relations in 
society and should concentrate on issues of repression, voice, power, participation, 
representation and inclusion, in the service of equality and democracy. 
 
The intention of critical theory is to be transformative of current social relations seen to be 
ƵŶũƵƐƚ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽůĚ ? ƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ  ?ĂŶĚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ƋƵŽ ? ?  dŚus, the key 
questions posed by critical theorists researching education involve: how educational 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂƚĞ ŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ǁŽƌƚŚǁŚŝůĞ ? ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ĂŶĚ
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how power is produced and perpetuated within education.  Habermas (1972) suggests that 
the three main areas of research contain an ideological purpose, for Positivists this is 
technical (how to solve a perceived problem), for interpretivists it is practical (how best to 
elucidate the subjectivities of human agents) and for critical theorists it is emancipatory. 
 
Habermas (1972) favours the methodology of ideological critique.  This methodology 
involves the uncovering of vested interests within discursive accounts.  For instance, 
positivist social research with its claims to neutral objectivity is seen by Habermas (1972) as 
ideologically loaded with laissez-faire values that perpetuate existing power differentials in 
society.  The methodology of ideological critique has also been popular with feminist critical 
research: 
 
 “dŚĞĚƌŝǀĞ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĞŐĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂnd emancipatory qualitative research is seen as 
necessary if women are to avoid colluding in their own oppression by undertaking positivist, 
ƵŶŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?ŽŚĞŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? P ?    
 
Roman and Apple (1990) argue for the use of ethnographic techniques combined with 
ideological critique and evaluating the value of research by its transformative emancipatory 
power. 
 
Regarding my own philosophical positionality, I have long regarded myself as falling into a 
 ‘ďƌŽĂĚĐĂŵƉ ?ŽĨ ‘ƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?KŶan ontological basis, I would view noumenal materialist 
reality as existing and shaping the lives of all (ala Marxist thought), yet beyond our 
immediate comprehension (Kant, 1781).  I see the human subjective phenomenological 
world as one of a constant interactive process and thus favour a generally hermeneutic 
approach to research, along with ideological criticism.  I would argue that the material 
noumenal environment is in a constant dialectic with human subjectivity and agency, as 
Marx famously said: 
 
 “DĞŶŵĂŬĞƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚŵĂŬĞŝƚũƵƐƚĂƐƚŚĞǇƉůĞĂƐĞ ?dŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
Ăůů ƚŚĞ ĚĞĂĚ ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞŝŐŚƐ ůŝŬĞ Ă ŶŝŐŚƚŵĂƌĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďƌĂŝŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ? (Marx, 
1852/1970:15). 
 
dŚĞ ĨŽĐƵƐŽĨŵǇ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŚƵƐĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŵĞŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ  ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?  ?ŝŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚƐƚŽ
ƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ? Ă ŐƌŽƵƉ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ƉŽǁĞƌůĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ  ‘ǀŽŝĐĞůĞƐƐ ? ƵŶƚŝů ĨĂŝƌůǇ
recently, since the publication of autobiograƉŚŝĐĂů  ‘ĨŝƌƐƚ-ŚĂŶĚ ? ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ďǇ autistic people 
(Grandin, 1996; Sinclair, 1993; Sainsbury, 2000); the establishment of Autistic charities (e.g. 
the National Autistic Society - NAS) and the rise of internet forums and groups (e.g. Autism 
Network International).  Within educational research, possibly like no other area, research 
into the education of Autistic people ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĨƌŽŵ ĂŶ  ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌ ? ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ.  For many 
years research into Autism has been dominated by Psychoanalysis, Behavioural and 
Cognitive Psychological approaches (Bettleheim, 1967; Lovaas, 1987; Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
2008).  One of the main ethical issues raised by my research interests, is to be careful not to 
ĐƌĞĂƚĞ Ă  ‘ŶĞǁ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ŽĨ ƚƌƵƚŚ ?  ?'ŽƌĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ  ‘ǀŽŝĐĞ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
participants without unwittingly subverting it.  Thus, by using hermeneutic methodologies 
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(disĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ƚĞǆƚƵĂů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨ ƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ? / ŚŽƉĞ ƚŽ ŐŝǀĞ  ‘ǀŽŝĐĞ ? ƚŽ Ă
group that traditionally has not had one, which in itself would be an empowering act.  
ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽďĞ  ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŵǇŽǁŶƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ will be laid bare for 
scrutiny. 
 
By using qualitative methodology, many issues of validity can arise, for example: faulty 
memory, inadequate vocabulary to express opinions, partial or erroneous knowledge 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƚĞůůƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ  ‘ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚƚŽŚĞĂƌ ? ?  /ŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐƵĐŚĚĂƚĂĂƌĞĂůǁĂǇƐƚĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ ?ĂŶĚďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶ ‘ĂďĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ?
reasoning  W Opie, 2004). 
 
Opie (2004) also points ŽƵƚ ?ƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇĐĂŶďĞĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝƌǀĂůƵĞs 
and belief systems, for example political ĂůůĞŐŝĂŶĐĞƐ ?, religious faith, class, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, historical and geographical location and so on.  In my own case, this is of clear 
relevance, as I am about to be assessed for ASD myself and my son was diagnosed with ASD 
ƐŽŵĞ ĨŝǀĞ ǇĞĂƌƐ ĂŐŽ ?  Ɛ ƐƵĐŚ ? / ŚĂǀĞ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ƐĞĞŶ ŵǇƐĞůĨ ĂƐ ĂŶ  ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌ ? ůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ŝŶ ŽŶ
ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚĐƵůƚƵƌĞ ?ĞĐŬĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǇĞƚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ/ĂŵƚŽďĞƉƌ ĚƵĐŝŶŐĂŶ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ
ŽƚŚĞƌ ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨǀĂƌious stakeholders in the area (as a person on the spectrum, a 
parent and educational practitioner).  Despite a recent general recognition of the validity of 
 ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞƌ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ? of Autism (Grayson, 2006), little research has been conducted into the 
social construction of Autism, and still less concerning Autistic subjectivities regarding 
educational practices. 
 
Ethical guidelines for research with human participants have been in place for many years 
with the British Psychological Society (BPS, 2009) and British Educational Research 
Association (BERA, 2009).  These codes of ethics stress the importance of preventing harm to 
research participants.  Cohen et al. (2000) suggest that researchers when reflecting upon 
ethical issues should ask themselves the question: how would I feel, if I were subjected to 
these research procedures?  If there is any doubt concerning possible harm than this should 
be considered in great depth. 
 
The issue of informed and voluntary consent is of paramount importance to Burgess (1989), 
arguing that participants in research should have the legal capacity to give voluntary consent 
and be situated as to be able to be self-determining in their choices.  If one were to take this 
to an extreme however, one could not research children or groups of vulnerable adults 
(despite some potentially supporting the use of transformative critical research that may 
empower their group).  Robson (2002) suggests that it is practically impossible to inform 
participants of every aspect of the research process, ǁŚŝĐŚůĞĂĚƐŽŶƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƐƐƵĞƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ‘ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ? ? 
 
/ƐƐƵĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇ ? ĂƌĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ůŽĂĚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ  ‘ǁŚŽƐŚŽƵůĚƐƉĞĂŬ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ ? dŚĞ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ĂĚǀŽĐĂĐǇŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŽĨƵtism Network 
International and writers such as Sinclair (1993) suggest nothing should be said about 
Autistic people without passing it by the Autistic community for commentary.  As a member 
of this community, I have a political allegiance to this view regarding those who can speak 
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for themselves (like me).  Having said this, not all Autistic people are able to speak for 
themselves (like my son) and thus will not be part of any direct intervention within my 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ĂƐ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ? is practically impossible.  The subjective 
views of those who cannot communicate them are beyond language and thus, as 
Wittgenstein (1921 ?ŵŝŐŚƚƐĂǇŽŶƚŚŝƐƚŽƉŝĐ ‘ǁĞŵƵƐƚƌĞŵĂŝŶƐŝůĞŶƚ ? ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚĞ
for this vacuum in my research, I aim to expand my literature review into a critical 
ideological analysis and deconstruction of educational theory and praxis regarding the 
education of all Autistic people.  At this stage however, I am unsettled on how to gain 
participation from other Autistic people ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ? ƚŽ ďƵŝůĚ Ă ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ  ‘ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ŚŽƌŝǌŽŶ ?
(Gadamar, 1975).   
 
It is vitally important not to exploit the group I myself belong to.  Greenbank (2003) 
highlights the potential for conflicting values between the researcher and those being 
researched.  Halliday (2002) argues that researchers should endeavour to be open to the 
views of research participants and engage in dialogue concerning the research.  Autistic 
people for decades have been subjected to invasive treatments and educational practices 
that are not in favour amongst many within the Autistic community.  Thus, empowerment of 
the participants in this project is of primary concern.  Simons and Usher (2002) take ĂŶ ‘ŽƉĞŶ
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ƚŽ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞŶƚĂŝůƐ ŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂůůǇ ĐŽůůĂƚŝŶŐ ǀŝĞǁƐ ? ŝŶŚŝďŝƚing 
ĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶ ? ĞŶƐƵƌŝŶŐ Ă ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ  ‘ǀĞƚŽ ? and providing as much clear information to the 
participants as possible.  This negotiation can perhaps never be equal in terms of power 
between the researcher and the research participants, yet by involving participants as much 
as possible in the research process, at all stages, and may reduce the power differential 
whilst accepting the positional influence of myself upon the construction of the project. 
 
Issues of positionality and reflexivity in the area of research into the education of Autistic 
people have sadly been largely lacking in previous research, as if people with Autism do not 
ŚĂǀĞĂ  ‘ǀŽŝĐĞ ? ? The thing is, many of them  ‘do ? ? Therefore it is the aim of this project to 
systematically expose the discourses currently being employed in this area, with particular 
focus on the discourse of Autistic people.  It is clear that my positionality is one of 
entrenchment in Critical Theory ?ǇĞƚďĞŝŶŐ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů  ‘ďŝĂƐ ?ŵƵƐƚŶŽƚďĞ
ŵĂŶŝƉƵůĂƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǀŽŝĐĞƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ / Ăŵ ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌ, and thus participation of the 
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